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Abstract
Zero-sum games are natural, if informal, analogues of closed physical systems where no
energy/utility can enter or exit. This analogy can be extended even further if we consider zero-
sum network (polymatrix) games where multiple agents interact in a closed economy. Typically,
(network) zero-sum games are studied from the perspective of Nash equilibria. Nevertheless,
this comes in contrast with the way we typically think about closed physical systems, e.g.,
Earth-moon systems which move perpetually along recurrent trajectories of constant energy.
We establish a formal and robust connection between multi-agent systems and Hamiltonian
dynamics – the same dynamics that describe conservative systems in physics. Specifically, we
show that no matter the size, or network structure of such closed economies, even if agents use
different online learning dynamics from the standard class of Follow-the-Regularized-Leader,
they yield Hamiltonian dynamics. This approach generalizes the known connection to Hamil-
tonians for the special case of replicator dynamics in two agent zero-sum games developed by
Hofbauer [16]. Moreover, our results extend beyond zero-sum settings and provide a type of a
Rosetta stone (see e.g. Table 1) that helps to translate results and techniques between online
optimization, convex analysis, games theory, and physics.
Mass on a Spring Matching Pennies Gradient Descent
(
x1 1− x1
)( 1 −1
−1 1
)(
x2
1− x2
)
Position q(t) of Mass Agent 1 Strategy x1(t)
Time t Time t
x∗
1
Momentum p(t) of Mass Agent 2 Strategy x2(t)
Time t Time t
x∗
2
q(t) vs p(t) x1(t) vs x2(t)
x∗1
x∗2
Conservation of Energy Constant Distance to Nash Equilibrium x∗
E = 12kq
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2(t) D =
1
2 (x1(t)− x
∗
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2 + 12 (x2(t)− x
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2)
2
Table 1: The physics of Matching Pennies when updated with Gradient Descent.
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1 Introduction
Undoubtedly equilibrium is the main notion through which games are studied and understood. Not
only are Nash equilibria the main solution concept but typically approaches that venture towards
understanding the behavior of adaptive agents in games still naturally gravitate to slight modifi-
cations of the same idea. For example, an evolutionary stable strategy [32] is a Nash equilibrium
refinement that captures attracting limit points of evolutionary learning dynamics. In the other
direction, coarse correlated equilibria are generalizations of Nash equilibria with the property that
the time average of the behavior of no-regret dynamics converge to them in general games [34].
Both of these equilibrium concepts, as well as many other axiomatics refinements or general-
izations to the notion of Nash equilibrium share the same unifying attribute. All of these solution
concepts are points. When we think of a game, i.e., an interaction of self-interested agents, we
typically and almost unconsciously argue about its behavior using static points. We wish to argue
that this way of thinking is limiting in a fundamental way as well as propose an alternative way of
thinking about these systems.
To consider the severity of these limitations, consider the following example: Suppose that you
were challenged to describe another many body interaction, e.g., the behavior of the Earth-Moon
system, or the behavior of two masses connected by an ideal spring or even the behavior of coupled
pendulums, but there was a catch. You were forced to output a single point of the state space
as your description for this system. Clearly, this requirement is too restrictive as any meaningful
model must be allowed to express non-equilibrium behavior and do so in a quantitative fashion (e.g.
what is the shape, energy of these orbits for different initial conditions?). Instead, the behavior of
these physical systems is captured by dynamical systems, specifically, Hamiltonian dynamics.
Interestingly, when we study multi-agent games and learning dynamics on them, we do not
find this restriction such a stifling roadblock, at least not intuitively. Thus we implicitly make the
assumption that the systems that we encounter when studying learning in games are fundamentally
different from any of the above. After all what does gradient descent or multiplicative weights in
Matching Pennies have to do with an Earth-moon system?
In the contrast to our error prone intuition, laborious formal inquiries into the limitations of
Nash equilibria, the foremost solution concept, have revealed an increasingly pessimistic picture
about their applicability, at least as a general purpose model for general-sum games. Not only are
Nash equilibria hard to compute [10, 8, 18] but they are also hard to approximate [31, 27, 28]. Even
their communication complexity seems prohibitive for practical considerations [13, 1]. Finally, a
plethora of simple and even small games exists where numerous learning dynamics do not converge
but instead can lead to cycles and other recurrent behavior [14, 9, 17, 3, 23, 19]. What are we to
make of all these failures?
Our key take home message in this paper is that besides these carefully documented formal
failures of the Nash equilibrium, there exists a much more insidious failure of intuition about
the efficacy of equilibrium, any sort of equilibrium, as a model even for the most classic game
theoretic instances. Revisiting our question, what does gradient descent or multiplicative weights
in Matching Pennies have to do with a mass system on spring? Or more generally, what is the
connection between a n-body problem (e.g. our solar system) and a closed economy with numerous
(e.g. thousands or millions) agents each possibly using different online learning algorithms from a
large and diverse family of dynamics such as Follow-the-Regularized-Leader/Mirror-Descent [7, 15]?
Surprisingly, we show that they are in a specific sense instantiations of the same phenomenon! They
are both Hamiltonian systems with notions of Hamiltonian energy that is preserved over time and
which dictates the shape of the system trajectories (see Table 1). Critically, this is not merely an
analogy but we present formal reductions from game theoretic dynamics to Hamiltonian systems.
2
This opens new ways of thinking and arguing about games that circumvent altogether the need
of using equilibria as a stepping stone. Despite Hamiltonians being an indispensable primitive in
the study of most physical systems, this formal connection seems to have received little attention
with few notable exceptions for special cases of this phenomenon, particularly for the case of
replicator dynamics in zero-sum (as well as coordination) games [16, 29, 4] and fictitious play [22,
33]. We unify and generalize this understanding by exploiting connections between online learning
and convex analysis. Along the way, we provide a natural interpretation about the emergence of
recurrent behavior in zero-sum games for numerous online learning dynamics [25, 24, 19, 11, 21]
and divergence from Nash equilibria in discrete-time settings [2]. We briefly summarize our results
below.
Our contribution. We analyze zero-sum and coordination two agent normal-form games. We
show that the dynamics created by applying the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm
are Hamiltonian (Theorem 3.2). This reduction establishes the equivalence between a mass on a
spring and gradient descent applied to Matching Pennies as shown in Table 1.
Moreover, we extend these results to all network zero-sum games [6, 5] and all coordination
bipartite network games (Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 4.2) demonstrating that the theory of Hamil-
tonian dynamics extends to an expansive set of games. These results can even be extended to
a larger class of payoff functions (Theorems 6.1 and 6.2) which includes almost every two-agent,
two-strategy, normal-form game (Corollary 6.3). In fact, Corollary 6.3 only excludes trivial games
where one of the agent’s payout is independent of the other agent’s actions.
Finally, we import some of the tools from the physics literature on Hamiltonians to unify several
recent results on online learning in games. We show that the strategies in a network zero-sum game
stay approximately equidistant from the Nash equilibrium when updated by FTRL (Theorem 5.1).
This generalizes a result from [25] that was for replicator dynamics, a specific variant of FTRL.
This result follows from the “invariant-energy” property of Hamiltonian systems. Another common
property of Hamiltonians is Poincare´ recurrence which is formally shown for network zero-sum
games in [25, 19]. Finally, we revisit a recent result in [2] where it was shown that the discrete-time
version of FTRL in network zero-sum games repels strategies from the Nash equilibrium. This
result follows intuitively from the fact that these discrete-time updates move along the tangent
of the boundary of the convex sublevel sets of the Hamiltonian/energy. Thus, these trajectories
have non-decreasing energy (Theorem 5.3) and as a result move outwards towards the boundary
(Corollary 5.4).
2 Preliminaries
A network game (or graphical polymatrix) consists of a set of n agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} where
agent i has a finite set of actions Si to choose from. Agent i may select a mixed strategy, xi, from
the |Si|-simplex Xi = {xi ∈ R
|Si|
≥0 :
∑
si∈Si
xisi = 1}. For each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , agent i has the
payoff matrix A(ij) such that agent i receives utility x⊺iA
(ij)xj given agent i and j’s strategies xi
and xj. This results in n optimization problems where agents act strategically and independently
to maximize their payouts.
max
xi∈Xi
x
⊺
i
∑
j 6=i
A(ij)xj ∀i ∈ N (Network Game)
A solution to a network game is a Nash equilibrium x∗. It satisfies
x∗i
∑
j 6=i
A(ij)x∗j ≥ xi
∑
j 6=i
A(ij)x∗j ∀xi ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ N . (1)
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Moreover, if x∗i is in the relative interior of Xi for each i then it is fully-mixed and (1) holds with
equality.
A separable zero-sum multi-agent game (zero-sum graphical game) [6] is a graphical polymatrix
(network) game in which the sum of all agent payoffs is always zero (
∑
i∈N xi
∑
j 6=iA
(ij)xj = 0 ∀x ∈
×Xi). These are games that encode closed systems, an economy where no resources/utility can
enter or exit and instead there is only exchange of utility between the agents. Although in this
game formulation the edge games are not necessarily zero-sum there exists [6] a (polynomial-time
computable) payoff preserving transformation from every separable zero-sum multi-agent game to
a pairwise constant-sum polymatrix game (i.e., a graphical polymatrix (network) game such that
for each pair of agents i, j : A(ji) = c{j,i}1 −
(
A(ij)
)T
and 1 the all-one matrix). Removing the
constants c{j,i}1 from each edge game does not affect the strategic nature of the game nor the
learning dynamics that we will consider. Hence for the rest of the paper we will focus on games
in the form A(ij) = −
(
A(ji)
)⊺
, i.e., polymatrix (network) zero-sum games [12]. On the antipode
of zero-sum games are coordination/partnership games where at each outcome both agents get the
same utility. We can represent both of them using the notation A(ij) = σ
(
A(ij)
)T
where σ = 1 for
coordination games and σ = −1 for zero-sum games.
2.1 Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL)
In many settings, agents do not know the payoff matrices nor the Nash equilibrium. In such
settings, agents adaptively update their strategies. The most well known class of algorithms for
online learning and optimization is Follow-the-Regularized-Leader. Given initial payoff vector yi(0),
agent i in (Network Game) updates their strategies at time t according to
yi(t) = yi(0) +
∫ t
0
∑
j 6=i
A(ij)xj(s)ds
xi(t) = argmax
xi∈Xi
{〈xi, yi(t)〉 − hi(xi)}
(FTRL)
where hi is strongly convex and continuously differentiable. The cumulative payoff vector yi(t)
indicates the cumulative payouts until time t – if agent i had played strategy si constantly since
time t = 0, then agent i would receive a cumulative payout of yisi(t).
Strong convexity of hi and convexity and compactness of Xi guarantee (FTRL) has a unique
solution and therefore xi(t) is well-defined. It is also well known that xi(t) = ∇h
∗
i (yi(t)) [30] where
h∗i (yi) = max
xi∈Xi
{〈xi, yi〉 − hi(xi)} (2)
is the convex conjugate of hi. The two most well-known versions of (FTRL) are the gradient descent
algorithm with hi(xi) = ||xi||
2
2 and the multiplicative weights algorithm, equivalently the replicator
dynamics, with hi(xi) =
∑
si∈Si
xisi log xisi .
2.2 Hamiltonian dynamics
A physical system may consist of several interacting, moving objects (sometimes referred to as
bodies or particles). To study each object, we track its position and momentum/velocity at time
t, q(t) and p(t) respectively. For simplicity we will assume that its mass is equal to one (m = 1)
so that momentum and velocity are equal. In many systems, there exist natural laws preserving a
relationship between the q(t) and p(t). Two such systems include a mass attached to a spring and
a pendulum.
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q(t)
(a) A mass applied
with force from a
spring.
q(t)
(b) A mass applied
with force from gravity
(a pendulum).
Figure 1: Physical systems of motion.
A well known concept from physics is “conservation of energy”. If no outside force acts on the
system, then energy is invariant at all times. Given a spring with constant k, a body with mass
m = 1, conservation of energy implies
1
2
kq2(0) +
1
2
p2(0) =
1
2
kq2(t) +
1
2
p2(t) (Energy of a Spring)
where 12kq
2(t) denotes the potential energy (the energy due to position) at time t and 12p
2(t) denotes
the kinetic energy (the energy due to motion) at time t.
By definition, velocity is related to position with p = q˙. However, in some systems it is simpler
to track the body’s motion with something other than q˙. For instance, a common way to track the
pendulum is with the velocity of the body, p(t), and to define the position, q(t), as the angle the
string forms with respect to the normal direction. Since q(t) ∈ R and p(t) ∈ R2, p 6= q˙. As such,
we refer to p(t) more generally as the motion of the system.
Hamiltonian dynamics are an important subset of physical systems that includes systems as
small as a mass on a spring or a pendulum and as large as the planetary orbits. Every Hamiltonian
dynamic has a Hamiltonian H(q, p) such that
∂H
∂p
=
dq
dt
= q˙
−
∂H
∂q
=
dp
dt
= p˙
(Hamilton’s equations)
Hamiltonians have a variety of well known properties including conservation of energy (time in-
variance of the Hamiltonian) and volume preservation. There are even large families of integra-
tors especially well suited for approximating solutions to system of differential equations given by
(Hamilton’s equations). We discuss these properties later in Section 5 as they relate to network
games.
3 The Physics of Two-Player Games
We begin our analysis with two player games. The position we will track in FTRL is agent 1’s
cumulative strategy X1(t) =
∫ t
0 x1(s)ds. Motion drives the change in position. As defined in
(FTRL), yt1 drives the change in X
t
1. Formally,
d
dt
X1(t) = x1(t) = ∇h
∗
1(y1(t)) and it is natural to
define y1(t) as the motion of the system.
Observe that y2(t) = y2(0)+
∫ t
0 A
(21)x1(s)ds = y2(0)+A
(21)X1(t). Therefore tracking y1(t) and
X1(t) gives us information about both agents via the perspective of agent 1. Symmetrically, position
and motion can be defined from the perspective of agent 2 with y2(t) and X2(t) instead. The idea
5
of defining the system from the perspective a single agent comes naturally when we consider the
dynamics in Table 1. The position of the mass on the spring corresponds to the agent 1’s strategy
and we associate the mass with agent 1. The velocity of the mass corresponds to agent 2’s strategy.
However, by associating the mass with agent 1, we have already framed our understanding of the
system through agent 1’s perspective.
Given that agent strategies are often the object of interest when discussing the dynamics of
games, it may be surprising that we are not tracking the actual strategy xi(t). However, the
mapping ∇h∗i : yi → xi is surjective but not injective. Therefore we only gain information by
tracking yi instead of xi suggesting that we can better understand the system using yi.
Now that we have an understanding of the position and motion of the system, we can define the
potential and kinetic energies. Just as gravity pulls an object toward the center of the Earth, the
regularizer h2 pulls x2(t) to the minimizer of h2. Similarly, h
∗
2 pulls y2(t) = y2(0) + A
(21)X1(t) to
the minimizer of h∗2 and we use −σh
∗
2
(
y2(0) +A
(21)X1(t)
)
to represent the potential energy in the
system. Analogously, the energy due to motion, i.e., kinetic energy, is h∗1(y1(t)). Thus, the total
energy in the system at time t is
H(X1, y1) = h
∗
1(y1(t))− σh
∗
2
(
y2(0) +A
(21)X1(t)
)
(3)
Theorem 3.1. The total energy H(X1, y1) is invariant when a two-agent coordination or zero-sum
(Network Game) is updated with (FTRL).
Proof. The result follows by taking the derivative of H with respect to t.
dH
dt
= ∇h∗1(y1(t))
⊺
d
dt
y1(t)− σ∇h
∗
2
(
y2(0) +A
(21)X1(t)
)
⊺
A(21)x1(t) (4)
= x1(t)
⊺A(12)x2(t)−∇h
∗
2(y2(t))
⊺
(
A(12)
)
⊺
x1(t) (5)
= x1(t)
⊺A(12)x2(t)− x2(t)
⊺
(
A(12)
)
⊺
x1(t) (6)
= 0 (7)
completing the proof of the theorem.
3.1 Hamiltonian dynamics of two-agent games
Recall the mass attached to the spring from Section 2.2. Thus far, we have only discussed the
position and motion of the mass as they relate to the total energy in the system and not the
dynamical system created by the spring. However, in this case, the dynamical system is described
entirely by the energy in the system. Since the mass is m = 1, the energy of the spring is invariant
and given by
H(q, p) =
1
2
kq2(t) +
1
2
p2(t). (8)
Recall that F = p˙ where F is force and p˙ is acceleration (time derivative of momentum). The force
enacted on a spring given position q(t) is −kq(t). Therefore
p˙ = F = −kq(t) = −
∂H
∂q
. (9)
Similarly,
q˙ = p(t) =
∂H
∂p
. (10)
Thus the system is Hamiltonian. Similarly, (FTRL) is a Hamiltonian system.
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Theorem 3.2. The dynamics (FTRL) on a two-agent coordination or zero-sum (Network Game)
are Hamiltonian with invariant H(X1, y1).
Proof. The proof simply follows by taking the partial derivative of H(X1, y1) with respect to y1
and X1.
∂H
∂y1
= ∇h∗(y1(t)) = x1(t) =
d
dt
X1(t) (11)
−
∂H
∂X1
= σ
(
A(21)
)
⊺
∇h∗2
(
y2(0) +A
(21)X2(t)
)
(12)
= A(12)∇h∗2(y2(t)) (13)
= A(12)xt2 =
d
dt
y1(t) (14)
H(X1, y1), X1, and y1 satisfy (Hamilton’s equations). Therefore, the system is Hamiltonian with
invariant energy H(X1, y1).
4 The Physics of Network Games
In this section, we extend Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 to network games with an arbitrary number of
agents. First we extend our results to coordination and zero-sum bipartite network games. In a
bipartite network game, agents are partitioned into disjoint N1 and N2. For agents {i, j} ⊆ Nk,
A(ij) is uniformly zero, i.e., there is no interaction between agents in the same partition. Second,
we extend Theorem 3.2 to all zero-sum versions of (Network Game).
4.1 Coordination and Zero-Sum Bipartite Network Games
To extend the results to bipartite network games, we study the system from the perspectives of all
agents in N1 via the variables yi(t) and Xi(t) for i ∈ N1. We define the energy in the system as
H(X, y) =
∑
i∈N1
h∗i (yi(t))− σ
∑
j∈N2
h∗j

yj(0) + ∑
i∈N1
A(ji)Xi(t)

 . (15)
With these definitions, we can immediately extend Theorem 3.2 to bipartite network games.
Corollary 4.1. H(X, y) is time-invariant when (FTRL) is applied to a bipartite coordination or
zero-sum (Network Game).
Corollary 4.2. The dynamics (FTRL) on a bipartite coordination or zero-sum (Network Game)
are Hamiltonian with invariant H(X, y).
We prove both corollaries by reducing a bipartite network game to a two-agent game.
Proof. By generalizing the idea of a strategy space, a bipartite game can be expressed as a two-agent
game. A bipartite game is written as
max
xi∈Xi

x⊺i
∑
j∈N2
A(ij)xj

 ∀i ∈ N1 (16)
max
xj∈Xj

x⊺j
∑
j∈N1
A(ji)xi

 ∀j ∈ N2 (17)
7
Since there is no interaction between agents i and j when {i, j} ⊆ Nk, their optimization problem
can be rewritten as
max
{xi}i∈N1∈×i∈N1 Xi


∑
i∈N1
x
⊺
i
∑
j∈N2
A(ij)xj

 (18)
max
{xj}j∈N2∈×j∈N2 Xj


∑
j∈N2
x
⊺
j
∑
i∈N1
A(ji)xi

 (19)
which is a two-agent game with the more general strategy space×i∈Nk Xi. Informally, this corre-
sponds to two meta-agents 1 and 2 that simultaneously make decisions for agents in N1 and N2
respectively. Moreover, (FTRL) yields the same dynamics on both formulations since the corre-
sponding optimization problems are separable.
Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 now follow directly from Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. First, observe that the
proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 only makes use of the fact that the strategy space is convex and
compact to obtain the equality xi(t) = ∇h
∗
i (yi(t)). Thus, both theorems extend to games with
arbitrary convex, compact strategy spaces and therefore to the bipartite network game described
in (18-19).
4.2 Zero-Sum Network Games
Unlike two-agent and bipartite network games, there is no clear side/perspective to study the
dynamics from in general network games. As result, we simultaneously examine all perspectives
via Xi and yi for all i ∈ N . This yields the energy function
H(X, y) =
∑
i∈N
h∗i (yi(t)) − σ
∑
j∈N
h∗j

yj(0) +∑
i 6=j
A(ji)Xi(t)

 . (20)
Theorem 4.3. The total energy H(X, y) is invariant when a zero-sum (Network Game) is updated
with (FTRL).
Theorem 4.4. The dynamics (FTRL) on a zero-sum (Network Game) are Hamiltonian with in-
variant H(X, y).
The proof of the theorems follow identically to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. Interestingly,
the theorems also hold for coordination network games. However, the energy function H(X, y) is
meaningless in such settings. Recall that yi(t) = yi(0)+
∑
j 6=iA
(ij)Xj(t). Thus, the energy function
can be rewritten as
H(X, y) = (1− σ)
∑
i∈N
h∗i (yi(t)) =
{
2
∑
i∈N h
∗
i (yi(t)) (σ = −1)
0 (σ = 1)
(21)
In the case of zero-sum network games (σ = −1), we are effectively double counting the energy in
the system. However, in coordination network games (σ = 1), the total energy is uniformly zero for
every possible trajectory of (FTRL) which provides no information about the actual dynamics.
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5 Using Tools from Physics to Gain Insight about Online Learning
Typically, the study of games is centered around the Nash equilibrium. As such, it may be surpris-
ing that the Nash equilibrium never appears in our analysis of the behavior of learning dynamics in
games. However, as we see in this section, our analysis has many implications regarding learning dy-
namics and the Nash equilibrium. Recall, every solution to (Network Game) is a Nash equilibrium
x∗i ∈ Xi and is such that
x∗i
∑
i 6=j
A(ij)x∗j ≥ xi
∑
i 6=j
A(ij)x∗j ∀xi ∈ Xi (22)
Moreover, if x∗ is in the relative interior of X , then we refer to x∗ as fully-mixed and (22) holds
with equality.
5.1 Conservation of energy
It is well known that Hamiltonians preserve energy, providing an alternative proof of Theorem
3.1. This conservation has significant implications for online learning in zero-sum games. In many
settings, such as economics, the “market” is studied from the perspective of the Nash equilibrium.
However, conservation of energy implies that agent strategies never get too close to a fully-mixed
Nash equilibrium when agents are adaptive. Therefore adaptive agents never actually realize equi-
librium behavior and may exhibit behaviors that are unforeseen to equilibrium analysis.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose x∗ is a fully-mixed Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum (Network Game), xi
and yi are updated according to (FTRL), and x(0) 6= x
∗. There exists a d > 0 such that the Bregman
distance from x∗ to x(t) is always at least d. Moreover, if the trajectory remains in the interior of
the simplex for all times t then the Bregman distance from x∗ to x(t) is time-invariant.
Proof. We start by iterating on a slight variation of an argument made in [19] that the Fenchel-
coupling (specifically in the sense of [20]) between x∗ and y(t) is time-invariant. The Fenchel-
coupling is defined as
F (x∗, y(t)) ≡
∑
i∈N
(h∗i (yi(t))− 〈yi(t), x
∗
i 〉+ hi(x
∗
i )) (23)
First, observe that
∑
i∈N 〈yi(t), x
∗
i 〉 is time-invariant:
∑
i∈N
〈yi(t), x
∗
i 〉 =
∑
i∈N
〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉+
∑
i∈N
∫ t
0
(x∗i )
⊺
∑
j 6=i
A(ij)xj(s)ds (24)
=
∑
i∈N
〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉+
∫ t
0
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
(x∗i )
⊺A(ij)xj(s)ds (25)
=
∑
i∈N
〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉+
∫ t
0
∑
j∈N
∑
i 6=j
(x∗i )
⊺A(ij)xj(s)ds (26)
=
∑
i∈N
〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉+
∫ t
0
∑
j∈N
∑
i 6=j
(x∗i )
⊺A(ij)x∗j (27)
=
∑
i∈N
〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉 (28)
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where (27) follows since x∗ is fully-mixed and (28) follows since the game is zero-sum. By definition
of Xi(t) and yi(t), H(X, y) = 2
∑
i∈N h
∗
i (yi(t)). Therefore, the Fenchel-coupling is
F (x∗, y(t)) =
∑
i∈N
(h∗i (yi(t)) − 〈yi(t), x
∗
i 〉+ hi(x
∗
i )) (29)
=
∑
i∈N
(h∗i (yi(t)) − 〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉+ hi(x
∗
i )) (30)
=
1
2
·H(X, y) +
∑
i∈N
(hi(x
∗
i )− 〈yi(0), x
∗
i 〉) . (31)
Thus, the Fenchel-coupling and half of the energy in the system differ by a constant implying the
Fenchel-coupling is time-invariant. The Bregman distance from x∗ to x(t) is defined as
D(x∗||x) ≡
∑
i∈N
(hi(x
∗
i )− hi(xi(t)) − 〈∇hi(xi(t)), x
∗
i − xi(t)〉) . (32)
The distance D is uniquely minimized at x = x∗ with D(x∗||x∗) = 0. Moreover, since the boundary
of X is compact and D is continuous, there exists a d > 0 such that D(x∗||x) ≥ d for all x on the
boundary. By [20], F (x∗, y(t)) ≥ D(x∗||x(t)) where equality holds whenever x(t) is fully mixed.
Therefore, when x(t) is fully mixed, D(x∗||x(t)) = F (x∗, y(t)) = F (x∗, y(0)) ≥ D(x∗||x(0)) > 0
since F is time-invariant and x(0) 6= x∗. Thus, D(x∗||x(t)) ≥ min{d,D(x∗||x(0))} > 0. If the
trajectory remains in the interior of the simplex for all t then D(x∗||x(t)) = F (x∗, y(t)) is constant
for all t, completing the proof.
Corollary 5.2 (Piliouras and Shamma [25]). Suppose x∗ is a fully-mixed Nash equilibrium of a
zero-sum (Network Game). Then the KL-divergence between x∗ and x(t) is time-invariant when x
and y are updated with the replicator dynamics.
Proof. Replicator dynamics and the KL-divergence are special cases of (FTRL) and the Bregman
distance respectively where h(xi) = xi log xi. Moreover, replicator dynamics guarantee that xi(t)
is interior for all t and the result follows from Theorem 5.1.
5.2 Recurrence in adversarial learning
Poincare´ proved that in certain systems almost all trajectories return arbitrarily close to their initial
position infinitely often, i.e., exhibit Poincare´ recurrence [26]. Recurrent behavior is important in
the applications of online learning because it implies that the behavior (approximately) repeats
itself, becoming more predictable overtime.
Poincare´ recurrence is typically shown via two properties: volume preservation and bounded
orbits. [25, 19] argue both of these properties directly to establish recurrence in the setting of
network zero-sum games. However, Hamiltonians provide the intuition for both of these arguments.
Volume preservation is a property held by all Hamiltonian systems. Moreover, many natural
Hamiltonian systems have bounded orbits and therefore are Poincare´ recurrent. In the case of
zero-sum games, as we discussed in the previous section, the energy in the system corresponds to
the total distance from the Nash equilibrium and, unsurprisingly, (FTRL) on network zero-sum
games with interior Nash has bounded orbits1 and therefore is Poincare´ recurrent.
1In general, yi(t) drifts according to
∑
j 6=i A
(ij)x∗j and therefore often is not bounded. However, adding a constant
to the payoff matrix does not change the dynamics of x(t) and therefore we may always assume
∑
j 6=i A
(ij)x∗j = 0
and yi(t) is bounded.
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5.3 Divergence from equilibrium in discrete-time
The results in continuous-time make it clear that the Nash equilibrium is not always an appropriate
tool to analyze a system where agents adaptively update their strategies. The study of Hamilto-
nians also shows thats the Nash equilibrium can be a poor solution concept in the discrete-time.
Specifically, in (FTRL), agent strategies tend to be repelled from the Nash equilibrium in zero-sum
games.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose a continuous dynamic y(t) has an invariant energy H(y). If H is contin-
uous with convex sublevel sets then the energy in the corresponding discrete-time dynamic obtained
via Euler’s method/integration is non-decreasing.
Proof. Let t denote the current time instant. Euler’s method with step-size η yields an approxima-
tion of y(t+ η) with
yˆt+η = y(t) + η
d
dt
y(t) (33)
We will show H(yˆt+η) ≥ H(y(t)). Suppose H(y(t)) = c and without loss of generality, assume
{y : H(y) ≤ c} is full-dimensional. Since {y : H(y) ≤ c} is convex, there exists a supporting
hyperplane {y : a⊺y = a⊺y(t)} such that a⊺y ≤ a⊺y(t) for all y ∈ {y : H(y) ≤ c}. Therefore,
a⊺
(
d
dt
y(t)
)
= a⊺
(
lim
s→0+
y(t)− y(t− s)
s
)
(34)
=
(
lim
s→0+
a⊺y(t)− a⊺y(t− s)
s
)
(35)
≥
(
lim
s→0+
a⊺y(t)− a⊺y(t)
s
)
= 0, (36)
implying
a⊺yˆt+η = a⊺y(t) + a⊺
(
η
d
dt
y(t)
)
(37)
≥ a⊺y(t). (38)
For contradiction, suppose H(yˆt+η) < c. By continuity of H, for sufficiently small ǫ > 0,
yˆt+η + ǫa ∈ {y : H(y) ≤ c}. However,
a⊺(yˆt+η + ǫa) ≥ a⊺y(t) + ǫ||a||22 > a
⊺y(t) (39)
contradicting that {y : a⊺y = a⊺y(t)} is a supporting hyperplane. Thus, the statement of the
theorem holds.
Corollary 5.4 (Bailey and Piliouras [2]). If x∗ is fully-mixed Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum
(Network Game), then the Fenchel-coupling between y and x∗ is non-decreasing in the discrete-
time version of (FTRL).
Proof. The discrete-time version of (FTRL) is simply Euler’s method applied to the continuous
time dynamics. The convex-conjugate h∗i is convex by definition and therefore the energy function
H(y) =
∑
i∈N h
∗
i (yi(t)) is also convex and therefore continuous. Hence, for y, y
′ ∈ {y : H(y) ≤ c},
H(αy + (1− α)y′) ≤ αH(y) + (1− α)H(y′) ≤ c. (40)
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Therefore αy + (1 − α)y′ ∈ {y : H(y) ≤ c} and H has convex sublevel sets. By Theorem 4.4, the
dynamic y(t) has invariant energy H(y). Therefore by Theorem 5.3, the energy in the discrete-time
dynamics is non-decreasing. In the proof of Theorem 5.1, it was shown the Fenchel-coupling differs
from the energy in the system by a constant when x∗ is fully-mixed. Therefore, the Fenchel-coupling
is non-decreasing.
The main result of [2] is that the strategies come arbitrarily close to the boundary infinitely
often. This can also be shown using Hamiltonians; Theorem 5.3 becomes strictly increasing with
strict convexity. Using continuity and compactness arguments, Corollary 5.4 can be strengthened
to show that the Fenchel-coupling and Bregman distance strictly increases by a positive constant
whenever x(t) is in a compact region in the relative interior of Xi. Since the Bregman distance
is continuous, every compact region in the relative interior of Xi has a finite maximum Bregman
distance and therefore x(t) must leave the region infinitely often. This holds for every compact
region in the relative interior of Xi and therefore x(t) must come arbitrarily close to the boundary
infinitely often.
5.4 Intuitive, accessible explanations of learning dynamics
Online learning is used in practice as a black box for adaptive, low regret decision making. We
have shown that Hamiltonians systems provide tools to significantly advance our understanding of
such learning dynamics. Just as importantly, Hamiltonians provide the tools to explain the results
of learning dynamics to someone with no understanding of differential equations or analysis and
only a basic understanding of physics.
Our analysis draws analogues between agent strategies, the NE, and the regularizer in (FTRL)
and the Earth, sun, and gravity respectively. In our solar system, the Earth’s momentum, propels
the Earth in a direction normal to the sun, and gravity pulls the Earth inwards towards the re-
sulting in a stable periodic orbit. This equivalence perfectly explains the non-convergent, recurrent
behavior of (FTRL) in a (Network Game). Further, a basic understanding of calculus provides
intuition for discrete-time dynamics. The discrete-time dynamics are obtained simply by “moving
tangentially to the curve”. Since continuous time strategies orbit around the Nash equilibrium,
discrete-time dynamics must diverge as in Corollary 5.4.
6 Generalizations of Games
In this section, we extend the theory to a more general class of games. As we discussed in Section
4.1, our results hold for any convex, compact strategy space, Xi. We further extend the results for
the more general payoff function
max
xi∈Xi


∑
j 6=i
(
x
⊺
iA
(ij)xj + b
(ij) · xi + d
(ij) · xj + c
(ij)
)
 ∀i (Generalized Network Game)
where A(ij) = σ
(
A(ji)
)⊺
. Again σ = 1 corresponds to a coordination (Generalized Network Game)
and σ = −1 corresponds to a zero-sum (Generalized Network Game).
With this new utility function, the dynamics of (FTRL) must be redefined. Observe that agent
i only has control of x⊺iA
(ij)xj + b
(ij) · xi and therefore only learns according to this component of
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their utility function. Thus, (FTRL) is rewritten as
yi(t) = yi(0) +
∫ t
0
∑
j 6=i
(
A(ij)xj(s) + b
(ij)
)
ds
xi(t) = argmax
xi∈Xi
{〈xi, yi(t)〉 − hi(xi)}.
(FTRL2)
Similar to (FTRL), agent i is still learning against agent j via the payoff matrix A(ij). However,
unlike a (Network Game), a (Generalized Network Game) is not a closed system; additional energy
is introduced into the dynamical system via b(ij). Nonetheless, (FTRL2) also admits Hamiltonian
dynamics after describing motion with yti and position with Xi(t). However, we modify the energy
function to remove the additional energy introduced by b(ij):
H(X, y) =
∑
i∈N
h∗i (yi(t))− σ
∑
j∈N
h∗j

yj(0) +∑
i 6=j
(
A(ji)Xi(t) + b
(ji)
)
−
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=j
b(ij) ·Xi(t).
(41)
Theorem 6.1. Given any set of convex, compact Xi, the dynamics (FTRL2) on a zero-sum
(Generalized Network Game) are Hamiltonian with invariant H(X, y).
The proof follows identically to Theorem 4.4.
Similar to Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 4.2, we can define the energy from one side of the network
for coordination games in two-agent and bipartite (Generalized Network Game).
H¯(X, y) =
∑
i∈N1
h∗i (yi(t))− σ
∑
j∈N2
h∗j

yj(0) + ∑
i∈Ni
(
A(ji)Xi(t) + b
(ji)
)
−
∑
i∈N1
∑
j∈N2
b(ij) ·Xi(t).
(42)
Theorem 6.2. Given any set of convex, compact Xi, the dynamics (FTRL2) on a coordination
or zero-sum, two-agent or bipartite (Generalized Network Game) are Hamiltonian with invariant
H¯(X, y).
It may not be immediately clear how the results on (Generalized Network Game) fits into the lit-
erature on learning theory. Certainly, the results imply our results in the setting of (Network Game)
by taking b(ij) = d(ij) = c(ij) = 0 and Xi to be the standard simplex. However, there is a more
nuanced reduction from (Network Game) to (Generalized Network Game) that allows us to extend
our results to a larger class of network games.
In (Network Game), the strategy space is Xi = {xi ∈ R
|Si|
≥0 :
∑
si∈Si
xisi = 1}. After selecting
si ∈ Si arbitrarily for each i, substituting xisi = 1−
∑
s′i∈Si\{si}
xis′i into (Network Game) yields
max
x¯i∈X¯i


∑
j 6=i
(
x¯
⊺
i A¯
(ij)x¯j + b
(ij) · x¯i + d
(ij) · x¯j + c
(ij)
)
 ∀i (43)
where X¯i = {x¯i ∈ R
|Si|−1
≥0 :
∑
s′i∈Si\{si}
x¯is′i ≤ 1}. It is straightforward to verify that this substitution
preserves the dynamics {xt}∞t=0 since the optimizer of a function does not change after a variable
13
substitution. Under this formulation, the dynamics are Hamiltonian if A¯(ij) = σ
(
A¯(ji)
)⊺
even if the
condition does not hold for the original payoff matrix A(ij). As a result, almost every two agent,
two strategy game admits Hamiltonian dynamics under (FTRL).
Corollary 6.3. Suppose Xi = {xi ∈ R
2
≥0 : xi1+xi2 = 1}. Then almost every two-agent, two-strategy
(Network Game) can be expressed as a coordination or zero-sum version of (Generalized Network Game)
and therefore has Hamiltonian dynamics.
Proof. Suppose the agents’ payoff matrices are given by
A(12) =
(
a b
c d
)
A(21) =
(
α β
γ δ
)
. (44)
After performing the substitution xi2 = 1− xi1, the two-agent game can be rewritten as
max
x11∈[0,1]
{(a+ d− b− c)x11x21 + (b− d)x11 + (c− d)x21 + d} (45)
max
x21∈[0,1]
{(α + δ − β − γ)x11x21 + (β − δ)x21 + (γ − δ)x11 + δ}. (46)
When performing this variable substitution, we must also update our definitions of yi(0) and
hi:
xi(0) = argmax
xi∈Xi
{〈xi, yi(0)〉 − hi(xi)} (47)
= argmax
xi∈Xi
{xi1 · yi1(0) + xi2 · yi2(0)− hi(xi1, xi2)} (48)
= argmax
xi∈Xi
{xi1 · yi1(0) + (1− xi1) · yi2(0)− hi(xi1, 1− xi1)} (49)
= argmax
xi∈Xi
{xi1 · (yi1(0)− yi2(0)) − hi(xi1, 1− xi1)} (50)
Therefore the new regularizer is h¯i(xi1) = h(xi1, 1 − xi1) and the new initial payoff vector is
y¯i(0) = yi1(0) − yi2(0). It is straightforward to verify that these substitutions yield the same
dynamics xi(t). For simplicity, we write xi1 as xi, y¯i as yi, h¯i as hi. Further, we rewrite (45-46) as
max
x1∈[0,1]
{a1x1x2 + b
1x1 + d
1x2 + c
1} (51)
max
x2∈[0,1]
{a2x1x2 + b
2x2 + d
2x1 + c
2}. (52)
For Theorem 6.1 to apply to this game, we need for a1 = σa2 for some σ ∈ {±1}. To accomplish
this, we will further modify agent 2’s payoff function, initial payoff vector y¯2(0), and regularizer h¯2
in a way that preserves the dynamics of (FTRL2). First, observe that for almost every two-agent,
two-strategy game, a1 = a+ d− b− c 6= 0 and a2 = α+ δ − β − γ 6= 0. Therefore, we can rewrite
agent 2’s portion of the game as
max
x2∈[0,1]
{
|a1|
|a2|
a2x1x2 +
|a1|
|a2|
b2x2 +
|a1|
|a2|
d2x1 +
|a1|
|a2|
c2
}
(53)
= max
x2∈[0,1]
{
σa1x1x2 + b¯
2x2 + d¯
2x1 + c¯
2
}
(54)
where σ ∈ {±1}. To preserve the dynamics x2(t), we must pass the change in the payoff function
into the initial payoff vector y2(0) and regularizer h2. This is accomplished with y¯2 =
|a1|
|a2|y2 and
h¯2 =
|a1|
|a2|h2. Once again, the dynamics {x
t}∞t=0 are preserved since the substitutions rescale the
maximization problem by the positive constant |a
1|
|a2| . Thus, after performing these substitutions,
the dynamics are Hamiltonian by Theorem 6.1.
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7 Conclusions
We have shown that online learning in games is a Hamiltonian dynamical system. Moreover, this
characterization provides a deeper understanding of games played in both continuous and discrete
time. In fact, several of the recent results on online learning can be described simply as a byproduct
of the Hamiltonian behavior. Research on Hamiltonian dynamics is rich and encompasses far more
than what is discussed in this paper. What are the other consequences of Hamiltonian dynamics
and what do they mean about online learning in games?
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